When I started collecting European books on cybernetics from the 50's and 60's I was impressed: during that time no field of knowledge remains untouched by cybernetics. There are books on cybernetics and theology, anthropology, and medicine; on cybernetics in politics, sociology, and economy, in fine arts, literature, and military strategy; on cybernetics and pedagogics, homeopathics, and anthroposophy; books for scientists and laymen; books for children and adults. It seems that almost everydiscipline became infected by a virus called cybernetics and started a process of reformulation or critique of its own fundamental terms in a cybernetic vocabulary. 
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From a historical point of view one might say that this was just a reflection or repetition of what happened in the ›primal scene‹ of the Macy Conferences, because they transported the notion of »interdisciplinarity« from wartime conditions to the so-called ›peace‹ of cold war times. In the papers of Warren McCulloch I discovered several lists of names that show how carefully this interdisciplinarity was constructed: 2 guests from electronics, 2 from psychology, 2 from anthropology, and so on. [1] And from another point of view it might be important that those people from different academic backgrounds and institutional contexts needed to find a common language or a set of shared differences to talk to each other. It's not at all surprising that Heinz von Foerster, who was the observer of this self-regulative process of observations inside the grouplater developed theories of second-order- Boolean algebra seem to exist somewhere outside our eternal world, but like Plato's immortal ideas they can be ›embodied‹ in the ›instruments of time‹ (Plato). So every thinkable thought can be implemented or embodied by a logical network. That's the reason why the logical calculus is so perfectly supported by Shannon's information theory: information remains the same regardless of it's embodying medium. It doesn't matter if information is stored in vacuum tubes or synapses or as ink on paper as long as the differences remain. The materiality of the medium simply doesn't matter for its functioning. I am not daring to speculate on the impact the social and political situation of the 50's had on this conception, but I want to recall Leibniz, who was often quoted as a ›patron‹ of cybernetics. So it seems to be more than a coincidence that Leibniz had the idea of a universal language and method of science built on formalized systems and deduction. Leibniz' four main points are: 1. to find discrete, ›atomic‹ symbols, 2. to set up rules for the order of those signs, 3. to ensure the reference between the symbolic and the real, and 4. to formulate transformation rules for generating new terms out of those symbols. In the last point of this scientific utopia we might discover an early version of Hilbert's concept of meta-mathematics, which was so important for digital computers. But I just want to focus on the points concerning discrete symbols and their reference.
Analog, digital, and the ›productive devil‹
The notions of analog and digital have been discussed at each of the ten Macy Conferences, and it seems that this never-ending topic is in some way so painful that it has to be cut off. The most traitorous episode was when Ralph
Gerard said the words »synapses are not acting digitally« (Pias, 2003, p. 175 It's not the right place here to resume all of the arguments about analog and digital, but I would like to emphasize at least three aspects of the discussions.
The first is represented by a statement of John von Neumann who gave the first talk on analog/digital at the first conference in 1946: »I [Neumann said] consider the living organisms as if there were purely digital automata« (Neumann, 1951, p. 10 »I think it is essential to point out that this involves a forbidden ground in between and an agreement never to assign any value whatsoever to that forbidden ground« (Pias, 2003, vol. 1, p. 187 ).
My impression is that McCulloch, von Neumann and others tried to expand that forbidden ground of the analog as far as possible, and that they had good reasons to do so, because this strategy promised to be highly productive. neglecting the analog, the medium, and the materiality as irrelevant (and thus building up a hierarchy) are attempts to get rid of the illusion and to gain error-free judgements. But as Kant already has proved two centuries before, it's an illusion to get rid of the illusion. I would suspect that even some of the high ambitions during the first wave of cybernetics were doomed to fail because of that disrespect to the illusionary function.
My second remark refers to a broader historical use of the term »illusion«. It was Michel Foucault who picked it up from Kant in his (still unpublished)
PhD thesis in 1961 [Foucault, 1961, pp. 124ff] . According to Foucault's diagnosis ›Man‹ has become an illusionary construction in the 18 th century.
Man is (as Foucault says) an ›empirical/transcendental doublet‹, something that is both the empirical object of knowledge and the center of every possible knowledge, something that needs to be understood and makes understanding possible at all. So ›Man‹ is a sort of new capture for Kant's diagram. Man is an illusion that is indispensable for the human sciences to work. (Foerster, 1948; Pias, 2003, vol. 1, pp. 98-121) represents the so far most important consideration upon the three questions raised concerning the ›cybernetic illusion‹ and it's foundation in repressing the analog. First, it was a plea against ignorance and trivialization and for respecting of the material culture not only that? of cybernetics. Second, it was a plea against the totalitarian view that ›all understanding of our world‹ is based on computable numbers and solvable problems. Third, it was a plea for keeping cybernetics experimental instead of instrumental, and to raise questions instead of providing solutions.
